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Non-epistemic Values and Scientific Knowledge  
Paul Burger, Basel 
In Science, Truth, and Democracy Philip Kitcher presents 
arguments to the effect that scientific inquiry is value-
dependent in so far as "scientific significance" is crucial to 
understanding the scientific enterprise and is analysable 
only in terms of human interests. He proposes a marriage 
between value dependence and moderate scientific 
realism, challenging thus a long-standing tradition of 
radically separating non-epistemic values and scientific 
knowledge. In my paper I want to make the rationale of 
that marriage more comprehensible and interpret it as a 
step towards a naturalized philosophy of science. In my 
first section I will make clear what I understand as "natural-
izing" and what I take to be the substantial problem, i.e. 
the steering function of non-epistemic values in cognitive 
processes. The second section will identify the assump-
tions on which the separation of non-epistemic values and 
knowledge are based. In the third section Kitcher's argu-
ments in favour of a marriage will be presented and 
evaluated. Finally, I will sketch a positive account how non-
epistemic values steer cognitive processes. 
I 
Quine wanted us to naturalize epistemology by reducing it 
to descriptive psychology. Because, however, scientific 
knowledge production is so obviously normatively steered, 
only a few philosophers have been willing to follow Quine's 
radical strategy. On the other hand, Quine's second 
naturalistic claim that epistemology should study human 
knowledge as it is in our actual world has not lost its 
power. Kitcher places himself along this line of reasoning 
and characterises naturalized epistemology by four 
principles (Kitcher 1992): 
(a) Epistemology aims to understand the epistemic 
quality of human cognitive performance. 
(b) The epistemic status of a cognitive state is de-
pendent upon the process that generates it. 
(c) Epistemology must make understandable those 
processes, which are reliable, i.e. lead to truths. 
(d) There is no a priori knowledge. 
Kitcher's effort to convince us of his marriage position is 
based upon the assumption that the knowledge generating 
processes have been regrettably simplified especially 
within philosophy of science. What is missing is an analy-
sis of the motivations for actions as an essential part within 
the scientific processes of knowledge production. As 
human actions and the values, which steer them, have an 
important function in cognitive processes the intended 
meaning of "naturalized philosophy of science" would be 
that scientific knowledge production has to be seen as 
embedded not only in theoretical but also in those practical 
activities that characterize human life. 
In regard of human actions as a component in epistemic 
processes we face a rather strange situation. The inter-
nalists do not hesitate to take actions into consideration. 
By reducing cognitive processes to the fulfillement of 
epistemic duties, however, only cognitive actions are 
accepted. Science as an organised human endeavour for 
truth finding is value dependent insofar the goal of cogni-
tive actions is truth and truth can be seen as an epistemic 
value. Unfortunately, this line of reasoning about actions 
displays at least three shortcomings. First, the interesting 
debate focuses on non-epistemic values not on epistemic. 
Second, the internalist's reduction to epistemic values will 
be undermined by two well-known disadvantages of any 
purely internalistic account, namely that fulfilling one's 
epistemic duties is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
knowledge because it does not guarantee truth-conduciv-
ity, and that it faces Cartesian scepticism (Plantinga 1993). 
Third, the internalist analyses action in purely rational 
(ideal) not in procedural terms eliminating thereby any 
relevance of the context of discovery. If, however, non-
epistemic values play a role within science then it will be 
within discovery processes. 
If we want philosophers to look at actions in epistemic 
processes then externalism, not internalism, seems to be 
the right place to look. By allowing causal processes to 
play a warranting function externalism radically under-
mines the traditional separation between context of 
discovery and context of justification. Externalists, how-
ever, are mainly concerned with dispositions, capacities 
and causal processes (in an adequate environment) in 
order to avoid the shortcomings of internalism. They do not 
pay much attention to action in cognitive processes. The 
rationale for excluding actions from externalist's theories is 
not difficult to identify. First, because actions are not fully 
analysable from a third-person-perspective, externalists 
have tried to avoid any commitment to them. Second, they 
are often not only sceptic to subjective factors but also to 
attributor factors within the truth condition for 'A knows that 
p'. Eventually, realists tend to take a Humean stand 
towards values and to treat them in a fully subjective 
manner (cf. "Canberra Plan"-philosophers). Within science, 
however, knowledge attribution (whether or not standards 
are fulfilled) is as important as non-epistemic background 
conditions such as funding, problem-solving etc. And both, 
meeting standards for knowledge attribution as well as 
non-epistemic background conditions, are "action-laden".  
Nobody who is aware on how research programs are 
normally set up can reasonably deny the relevance of non-
epistemic values (interests) in science policy. More 
questionable is the epistemic role of these values. The 
strange situation we have vis-à-vis them within epistemol-
ogy can be summarized as follows: Values steer human 
actions, i.e. our interaction with our environment. Those 
who are willing to consider actions in epistemology – 
internalists – treat them in a reductive manner by allowing 
only epistemic values. Those who are willing to consider 
human cognitive power in our actual world – externalists – 
often treat epistemic processes reductively too by not 
permitting any "subjective" components such as actions. 
II 
The ban on non-epistemic values in epistemology and 
philosophy of science has a long tradition. Science itself 
has given us enough reasons to be very careful regarding 
them. There have been many cases illustrating the 
problem of cultural, gender or economic bias in research. 
The critical and normative epistemological attitude towards 
non-epistemic values vis-à-vis knowledge is based on 
good reasons: if an acquired belief is to become accepted 
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as knowledge, then non-epistemic values are not allowed 
to play a justifying role. There is no point in challenging 
that. 
There is, however, epistemologically more to the func-
tion of non-epistemic values in knowledge production. The 
ban against them is based upon four assumptions. The 
first is to look upon knowledge as basically mapping the 
natural world objectively whereas values are treated as 
subjective. The second amounts to the claim that the 
context of discovery and the context of justification can 
successfully become separated. The third – interestingly 
enough shared by both, instrumentalists and realists – is 
that value-dependence leads to instrumentalism. The 
fourth denies that non-epistemic values can be truth-
conducive in whatever sense.  
If you want - like Kitcher - to marry non-epistemic values 
with scientific realism you can do that in a weak or strong 
form. You can look upon their function within knowledge 
production either simply as compatible with realism or 
stronger as truth-conducive in some sense. Kitcher seems 
to favour the weaker form. He especially challenges 
assumption three without thinking about truth-conducivity. 
Kitcher's strategy to undermine assumption three aims at 
critically analysing the force of the instrumentalist's darling, 
the underdetermination-thesis. Because he sees no point 
in claiming that we always have to choose between 
equally well supported rival hypotheses, he concludes that 
"there is no basis for believing that value judgments 
inevitably enter into our appraisal of which of a set of rival 
hypotheses […] is approximately correct" (2001, 41). I fully 
agree with him. 
Unfortunately, the argument does not establish a posi-
tive epistemic function of non-epistemic-values. But if 
values are relevant because they help to "divide things into 
kinds to suit our purposes" (49) and that function is 
compatible with scientific realism, then a positive epistemic 
function must be demonstrated. Kitcher also implicitly 
rejects assumption two on the basis of his reliabilism. 
Because, however, the standard naturalistic arguments 
are causal and not axiological this will not add evidence in 
favour of the marriage-position.  
III 
As a positive argument in favour of his weak "compatible-
position" Kitcher presents what I call "the success argu-
ment". It has two components. The first is that much of 
scientific research is obviously interest-oriented (biotech-
nology, environmental science). It can simply not be 
denied that scientific knowledge production is dependent 
upon value-decisions and directed to value-laden human 
actions. The second component is that hypotheses and 
theories nevertheless lead to successful application in our 
interaction with the world. That argument relies on the 
hidden premise that success implies truth (Kitcher: "accu-
racy"). 
Kitcher's paradigm case for demonstrating the relation 
between interests (values) and success is the "motiva-
tional analogy" between science and cartography (chap. 
5), since, in his view, maps are like belief-systems or 
theories and they potentially represent reality accurately 
and completely - relative to certain standards. A hundred 
philosophers meet each other in Kirchberg every year. 
Why are they successful in meeting there? They follow 
maps and timetables announcing when planes will depart 
at Y and will arrive in Vienna, which train one should catch 
at which station etc. Given normal circumstances (and a 
properly functioning cognitive apparatus) philosophers 
succeed in reading the given information. Maps are more 
or less reliable within their domain. Why are they reliable? 
Because, Kitcher answers, they are designed to serve our 
purposes first of all. They are, however, not reliable 
because of the purposes. They are reliable, because they 
are produced with adequate methods and allow successful 
prediction based actions. 
According to Kitcher, the "motivational analogy" should 
not be taken as an argument. The problem, however, is 
that the analogy makes even his weak position doubtful. 
He starts with the metaphor that nature is like a block of 
marble (p. 44), which is shapeable by a sculptor in infinitely 
many ways. The analogy then amounts to the following 
claim: because nature is like this (and is not, as realists 
usually claim, structured in itself) values can steer our 
cognitive interests such that it directs our epistemic focus 
in picking relevant parts out of a complex marble-like 
nature. Instrumentalism lurks behind such a picture. If we 
epistemically shape nature the way a sculptor shapes a 
piece of marble then, strictly according to the analogy, 
knowIedge will be nothing more than an artefact - which is 
not what a moderate realist wants to be committed to. 
With the alleged "marble ontology" instrumentalism will 
inevitable come back in through the back door. Even a 
moderate scientific realism needs the ontological pre-
sumption of a structured world because otherwise there 
would be no definite truthmakers (occurring states of 
affairs) available. Values can only have a positive epis-
temic function if they direct our epistemic focus to struc-
tured components of the world. Let us therefore use a 
structure-ontology and assume it to be true that all entities 
are composite and structured (systems). A system is 
constituted by its individuals (with their qualities), its 
structure (the relations holding between its individuals) and 
its environment (the interacting relations between the 
individuals within and outside the system). Suppose further 
that our world is a complex system of systems. The 
interesting epistemological question then will be how we 
draw the distinctions such that the truth-conditions for "A 
knows that p" become fulfilled where p is made true by a 
system (e.g. a tree), i.e. how the boundaries of that system 
should be drawn. Like Kitcher I believe that values can 
steer our cognitive processes by directing our epistemic 
focus in picking relevant parts. 
What remains to be demonstrated is the positive epis-
temic function of non-epistemic values, I claim to exist. 
Apart from the weakness of his marble-ontology, Kitcher's 
"success-argument", won't be good enough to do the 
epistemologically demanded job. Newton's theory can still 
be successfully applied within its restricted domain. 
Nevertheless, it is not true. Success is an indication, can 
add evidence, but it can also display truth by pure chance 
– what no epistemology can accept. 
IV 
As a prerequisite for my demonstration I need an account 
of values. Values, the old Humean story goes, have 
nothing to do with the structure of nature. Like Kantian 
categories they are looked upon as a part of our subjec-
tivist clothes we dress nature with. And because values 
steer our actions, and actions should always be judged 
morally, values are not only treated subjectively (psycho-
logically) but also morally. However, both treatments are 
overtly one-sided. On the one hand, the subjectivists 
ignore the qualities of entities as a material basis for the 
goods that values are directed to. As a consequence, 
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values become deprived from their objective component. 
On the other hand, the adherents of an exclusively moral 
understanding of goods ignore that there are moral as well 
as non-moral goods. The ability to write German according 
to the new rules for example may or may not be a good. If 
it is a good, then it will not be a moral but an instrumental 
good. If there are limited resources of clean air and fresh 
water, that could become morally relevant. Clean air and 
fresh water are goods but not per se moral goods. Ac-
cordingly, I take the following definition of values to be 
adequate: 
For all Z, Z is a value iff 
(1)  Z is an intentional object for an individual A, 
(2)  Z refers to a state of affairs X and 
(3)  it is the case 
a) that X has certain qualities such that it is 
a good, and 
b) X counts for A as a good  
(whether X occurs or does not occur). 
 
There is certainly more to say about that proposal (cf. 
Lemos 1995). For the sake of the argument I will take it for 
granted and will base my analysis on it. 
It is a reliability-account I have in mind. Some non-epis-
temic values steer some cognitive processes such that the 
conditional probability that these processes lead to truth is 
higher than it would be without such values. Although 
many believe that reliability asks for a third-person-per-
spective a semantic (deflationary) understanding of the 
truth-predicate will block much of what could be threaten-
ing for reliabilism here. Therefore and again for the sake of 
the argument, I will take it for granted that reliability is a 
worthy component within an epistemic theory. 
Furthermore, there is the notion of scientific significance. 
Non-epistemic values can help to build what Kitcher calls 
"significance graphs" (chap. 6). "Scientific significance" 
has a double meaning, pointing to inner-scientific epis-
temic relevance and to relevance for human practice. My 
present concern is on the former. "Epistemic relevance" 
has a double meaning once again. It can mean "significant 
truths" or "something, which influences the contingent 
pathways of scientifically interesting questions". Unlike 
Kitcher, however, I have argued that the latter does not 
entail the former from a realist point of view. The marriage 
will only become comprehensible if some truth-conducive 
function of non-epistemic values in their influence on 
scientifically interesting questions is demonstrated. 
My claim is then that non-epistemic values steer cogni-
tive processes in three fundamental ways: (a) by co-
determining the selection of objects for knowledge produc-
tion, (b) by co-determining the selection of causal informa-
tion; (c) by motivating individuals and groups to proceed 
according to epistemic norms and even to improve them 
inductively. 
Imagine the following situation. A group of environmen-
talists wants us to protect a species A in a region B. They 
look upon A as an indicator for a healthy environment, 
presupposing that the latter is an important good for us. 
The hunters in B, however, reject the attempt to protect A. 
They point to their hunting rights and understand hunting A 
as an essential part of their social identity. Moreover, they 
can see no threat for the population A because of its 
reproduction rate. 
Suppose now that region B is a complex system, con-
stituted by a sum of individuals, the latter standing in 
structuring relations between them and between individu-
als from the systemic environment. Suppose B is a large 
forest and deer are the species in question. Within the 
large forest there are also regions of agricultural produc-
tion and small villages. Where do we draw the boundary of 
the system? What is part of B or part of the environment of 
B? What consequences do we face accordingly for the 
truth-conditions of statements like "B is such-and-such"? 
Non-epistemic values can have a steering function in 
such cases. From the point of view of the environmental-
ists A is an instrumental good regarding the more general 
good "healthy environment", for the hunters A is an 
instrumental good for " social identity". Furthermore, the 
valuing is based upon different hypotheses regarding the 
population of A (reproduction rate allows hunting – calls for 
protection). Let us now bring scientists (e.g. biologists and 
sociologists) into our picture. 
Firstly, how do they get their research objects within the 
system B? There is likeley some scientific state of the art 
regarding the subject matter. The value dispute, however 
can steer a cognitive selection process towards picking A 
as research object out of number of alternatives (deer not 
mice etc). The important point here is that the value-
dispute together with the underlying hypotheses brings in 
possible defeaters and there is quite a good agreement on 
their epistemic function. 
Secondly, the value dispute can steer the selection 
process towards causal information in at least two ways. 
We want to understand the relevant causal interaction 
between A, the system B and its environment in order to 
decide between the competing hypotheses implied by the 
value-dispute. And it is causal relevance, which will 
normally enter into the truth conditions for "B is such and 
such". Moreover, given the account of values I propose the 
scientists will also be directed towards an inquiry on the 
role of the goods in question. What qualities make a region 
a healthy environment? What causal impact can values 
have on a system like B? Non-epistemic values can, 
therefore, co-determine the selection of causal information 
because values itself are based upon (causal) qualities 
and have causal consequences by steering our actions. 
Thirdly, the disputing values may have a steering func-
tion towards methods. Because possible defeaters are 
involved, scientists can become motivated to think about 
adequate methods (cf. the case of forest deaths). More-
over, where a public debate on competing values takes 
place the public decisions to be made may be dependent 
upon the methodological reliability of the research proc-
esses in question. The public controversy on climate 
models for example has forced the scientists to improve 
such models. 
These things considered we can say that the conditional 
probability that these value-steered processes lead to 
truths about A within B is higher than it would be without 
non-epistemic values. I do not claim that non-epistemic 
values steer human knowledge production in all possible 
cases or that they exclusively determine knowledge 
production. I rather defend the moderate claim that non-
epistemic values can play an important role in scientific 
knowledge production. And because their truth-conducivity 
is based upon the purported (and defeasible) qualities of 
the goods values are directed to the steering function of 
values and moderate realism are authorized to celebrate 
their marriage. Moreover, the given defence of the mar-
riage displays a much more adequate picture of science 
than the rationalists still offer us. 
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